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  CONSTITLABOUR LEICESTER09  
THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF LABOUR RIGHTS1   
Lecture at the School  of Law, University of Leicester  




I  THE LINK BETWEEN LABOUR RIGHTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
I will begin with an existential question:  why am I here?   Why is  someone with a 
special  interest in labour rights appearing in a speakers’ series devoted to human 
rights?   
Yes, it’s true: workers are human; they are not commodities; they are not factors of 
production.  People with an interest in human rights should therefore be as interested in  
the oppression of workers as they in the oppression of people of colour or women or 
disabled people.  But labour rights and human rights are not easily  collapsed into a 
single category.  Labour rights have historically  been framed as collective, human 
rights as individual;  labour rights are  class-based;  human rights claim to be  universal 
in their justification and application. Labour rights have generally been vindicated 
through  economic and political action; human rights have been advanced through 
cultural and social change and, more recently, through litigation.  Labour has tended to 
assert  its rights  at the level of the workplace and the nation state; human rights 
movements in recent years have  tended to be trans-national.   And a point of some 
importance:  labour rights have tended to be marginalized in the shaping of the new 
global economic order,  while human rights have been embraced by  adherents of the  
Washington consensus as both a precondition and consequence of global  capitalism.   
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Now one further complication: people in  many countries, including the United Kingdom, 
have come to regard  trade unions as selfish and irresponsible and their political allies 
—  Labour and Social Democratic parties —  as well past their sell-by date.  Anyone 
who  harbours such a  view of the political and industrial wings of the labour movement 
is likely to balk at  inscribing labour  rights in the  lexicon  of human rights.  And to make 
matters even more difficult,  such views are sometimes  held by members of  groups 
that were historically excluded from  labour markets or  relegated to their  margins, but  
now invoke  human rights laws to vindicate their rights  against both employers and 
unions.    At the very least, one might say, establishing the affinity of human rights and 
labour rights  is both   a conceptual and a political challenge.    
Nonetheless, the discourse of labour rights has swung sharply in the direction of human 
rights.  Why?  For negative reasons and positive ones as well.   The negative reasons 
are these:  workers no longer identify themselves as  producers but as consumers; 
labour has therefore lost its raison d’etre as  a class-based economic  and political 
movement.  Moreover,  changes in labour markets and modes of production have also 
robbed it of much of its former economic power, while  globalization has made its 
national focus increasingly anachronistic.  As a  consequence of these and other 
developments,  workers  in most  advanced democracies  confront greater individual 
insecurity and loss of collective agency  than they have  in decades.   Hence the shift of 
labour advocacy in the direction of human rights.   Aligning itself with the cause of 
human rights will (it is hoped) broaden the base of the labour movement and rebuild its 
alliance with other progressive forces; engaging with  the discourse of human rights will  
renew its  intellectual energy  and refresh its message; and adopting the legal and 
constitutional strategies of its sister movement will  enable labour to secure solid 
protections for workers  comparable to those that human rights advocates have won for 
all  citizens  over the past half-century.    
What will this mean in practice?  Human rights movements are deeply committed to 
constitutionalism.    On the one hand, we have seen the adoption of a number of 
impressive  constitutional texts  including  conventions and charters on  human rights 
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adopted by the UN, the EU and other trans-national regimes, as well as  the Canadian 
Charter of 1982 and  the UK Human Rights Act of 1998.  On the other, there has been a  
great surge of  legislation, implementing these constitutional texts  and a  spectacular 
outburst of  litigation by citizens asserting  and vindicating  their rights.    If workers’ 
rights  — to organize, to bargain, to  strike,  to receive a living wage, to  enjoy decent 
working conditions, to have a voice in workplace decisions, to be treated with respect — 
if all of these  rights were reconceived  as human rights, they  too could be 
constitutionalized; and they  too would be robustly protected.   That at least is the hope.   
So in answer to the question “why am I here”:  I am here to examine this turn in  the 
discourse of labour law.     
II THE RIGHTS-BASED LITIGATION-DRIVEN JURIDICAL MODEL OF 
CONSTITUTIONALISM   
To restate:  the great ambition  of  labour  rights advocates  today is that workers’  rights 
should also  be constitutionalized: that they should be  entrenched in the country’s basic 
law;  that no law  should be able to derogate from them;  and that they should be 
justiciable: workers  denied their rights should be able to secure  legal redress.  The 
results would be transformative (these advocates argue); the  costs would be minimal; 
the world would be a better place.     
This rights-based, litigation-driven  juridical  model of constitutionalism is not the only 
one on offer; I will mention several alternatives shortly. However it is a model that 
beguiles labour advocates, as it does  many  progressive thinkers and legal scholars 
who believe in the transformative potential  of law.  They imagine that litigating 
constitution rights  will  somehow succeed in balancing  capitalism’s  equation of 
unequal power,  ensure  social justice  and  put material flesh on the dry,  legal bones of 
the  liberal-democratic state.   And now I  have to admit, if you haven’t already guessed:  
I am an advocate of labour rights; I am a progressive; and (I hope) I am a scholar: but  I 
am not beguiled.   
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The rights-based, litigation-driven juridical  model of constitutionalism  is found in its 
purest form in America, whose fundamental law guarantees freedom of  association, 
assembly,  expression and procedural due process.   These guarantees might, in 
principle, have been  interpreted  as protecting the right of workers  to join unions, 
engage in industrial action, and be dismissed only on notice and for cause.  But of 
course  they were not.   The result —  advocates of constitutionalization claim —  is  that 
in  America  union membership in the private sector has fallen to about  8% — its lowest 
level in 100 years; that strikes are an endangered species; and that workers are still 
presumed to be employed “at will” and subject to dismissal without notice or recourse. 
All of this is true, but does it follow that if  labour’s rights under the constitution had been 
acknowledged and protected,  the lot of American workers would  be better than it is?    
Let’s look at some international comparisons.   A  number of  European countries  that  
have  entrenched  labour rights in their constitutions.  Workers in those countries  seem 
to enjoy higher living standards,  greater job security  and more influence over their 
working lives than do  American workers.   But does this prove that  constitutionalization 
produces better outcomes for workers?  Or merely that countries where  there is 
widespread political   and social support for  decent treatment of workers  are more 
likely than others  to  constitutionalize  arrangements designed  to produce those 
outcomes?    This much, however, we do know:  in few, if any, European  countries is  
U.S.-style rights-based constitutional litigation used to effect fundamental changes in  
workers’ protections or in labour market policies.    
Canada provides another  instructive comparison.   In a startling recent  series of 
decisions,  Canadian appellate courts  have held that under our  Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms,  workers have the right to associate in unions, to call on their employers to 
bargain in good faith with that union, to  engage in industrial action to protect their 
interests, and to be protected against  legislative attempts to  restrict those rights or to 
override  collectively bargained agreements.   The courts have also  ruled that the 
industrial torts and the common law of wrongful dismissal must be reconfigured to 
accord with  Charter principles.  Is this not proof-positive that constitutionalization of 
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workers’  rights will revive labour’s  flagging fortunes?   
 
Time will tell, but my own prediction is that — the Charter notwithstanding — ten or 
twenty years from now, Canadian union membership and power will have declined not 
grown;  that Canadian workers will enjoy lower, not higher, wages; that  their  jobs will 
be more, not  less, precarious; and that the social safety net that protects them against 
the vicissitudes of the labour market will have fewer strands and more holes.  If I’m 
right,  if the Charter fails to protect labour rights in the real world, I now  add,  it will be 
true to form:  all the available empirical evidence suggests that its potential to  bring 
about social transformation in other  domains — including human rights — has been 
greatly over-estimated.      
 
How can this be?   Rights-based  constitutional litigation ought in principle to be  the 
most efficacious way to ensure that  employment relations are  fair in both a substantive 
and procedural sense.     
 
Alas,  in  practice litigation is unlikely to alter the deep structures of society and 
economy that relegate  workers to a subordinate role in their relations with employers.    
There are many reasons why this is so: 
 
 because constitutions typically limit state — not private, corporate —  power;  
 because labour rights are  necessarily couched in general language that can 
easily be read down;  
 because judges often  comprehend labour  rights less well and value them less 
highly than those of other interest groups;  
 because litigation is expensive, slow and  often  inaccessible to  individual 
workers or their  representatives;   
 because evidentiary and procedural rules  generally make constitutional litigation 
unsuitable for the resolution of open-ended conflicts of social interests;   
 because remedies that might fundamentally transform labour’s situation  would 
require a redistribution of wealth and power that courts lack the capacity to 
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design,  a mandate to initiate or the means to implement;  
 and because by pursuing  their recourse  within the existing constitutional 
framework, workers would be implicitly  agreeing to abstain from using their 
economic and  political power in ways that would  radically alter that framework  
—  a Faustian bargain they might  well come to regret.   
 
 III ALTERNATIVE MODELS OF CONSTITUTIONALIZATION 
 
However, as I mentioned earlier, the rights-based litigation-driven juridical model of a 
constitution is not the only one available.  Many states — in both the global North and 
the global South  — have dealt with  labour rights in their  constitutions, often in  
language that is merely  symbolic or evocative rather than tightly prescriptive.  However, 
some of these constitutions  specify  that legislation should be enacted to regulate  
employment relations,  that the state should strive to achieve just labour market 
outcomes, or  that employers and workers should  collaborate in the management of 
enterprises.   But  oddly, while these states have  “constitutionalized” labour  rights in 
similar ways, they  seem to end up adopting very different  laws and  policies, 
constructing  very  different  labour market institutions and  achieving very different  
degrees of industrial peace, social justice and  national prosperity.   In fact,  one is 
struck by the total  disjuncture  between  the constitutional model adopted to protect  
labour rights,  on the one hand, and actual workplace and labour market outcomes on 
the other.  Rather,  outcomes  seem almost wholly attributable to other factors:  national  
demographies and  endowments,  national histories and  cultures, and above all,  the 
forces of national and international political economy.    
  
I want to say a word specifically about the United Kingdom which, as you know, 
exemplifies  a unique model of constitutionalism.   Traditionally  the British “constitution”   
was  understood  merely as  “that which  constitutes” the polity.  It comprises a  
miscellany of  charters and declarations, statutes and common law rules,  invented 
traditions and unwritten conventions  that define the composition and  functions  of  
Parliament,  the judiciary, the executive and the Crown, as well as  relations amongst 
them and with citizens.  Litigation was at best marginal to this constitutional model.  In 
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this sense,  it was  a political constitution,  rather than a juridical one.   Moreover, its  
effects on labour rights  were, at best,  indirect.   For example,  the advent of  a 
universal electoral franchise facilitated  the rise of  the Labour Party and, after 1945, the 
introduction of  the  welfare state and other labour market interventions.    
 
However, things have changed somewhat.  The  British constitution is no longer strictly 
a political constitution; it has become more of a rights-based  juridical constitution, on 
the American model.   The  Human  Rights Act 1998  now gives juridical force to, 
though it   does not yet fully entrench, an array of   human rights.  However, since most 
of  the rights enumerated in the 1998  Act  deal  only   peripherally with labour rights,  
this shift  has  so far had little direct impact on workplace relations.   
 
But the  United Kingdom has not only a new juridical constitution bolted onto the side of 
its  old political constitution.  It may also have acquired, almost unnoticed, an economic 
constitution.  The concept of an economic constitution enjoyed brief prominence  in 
Weimar Germany during the interwar period, and was  advanced in this country by  Otto 
Kahn Freund, a former Weimar labour court judge and the leading  British labour lawyer 
of  his time.   The essence of the Weimar ideal was that  workers and employers  should 
be constitutionally guaranteed  a direct role in shaping labour law  at every level from 
the enterprise to the region to the sector to the national parliament, with  a view to 
creating an “autonomous” system of labour law.    Kahn Freund’s goal was much the 
same, but his approach differed. He maintained that in the UK,  it was not constitutional  
guarantees but  “the abstention of law”—  what he called the principle of  “collective 
laissez faire”  —  that gave workers and employers a protected space within which to  
establish wages and working conditions through  collective bargaining.   This   principle  
was “constitutional” in the sense that it constituted  the fundamental  premise of British 
industrial relations.   
 
But though  quintessentially “British” — in the sense that it was unwritten, organic, 
imprecise,  and non-justiciable  — Kahn Freund’s laissez faire version of the “economic 
constitution” ultimately gave way to  the dense regime of substantive and procedural law 
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that now  regulates British workplaces.   Like the political constitution, the economic 
constitution of the United Kingdom is today in part  inspired and  mandated by Europe;  
but it is also driven by  changes in British politics, society, law and economic life,  and 
by  perceived or desired shifts in the balance of power in British labour markets.   Alas, 
after a half century of  intense encounters with  these more explicit forms of 
constitutionalization,   many British workers  are worse off, in a relative sense,  than 
they were  when Kahn Freund’s idea of an economic constitution was ascendant.    Alas  
it isn’t sufficient that  that labour  rights are in some way “constitutionalized”: what 
counts is  the content of those rights, the institutions and processes through which they 
are protected, and especially  the political economy in which they are meant to be 
realized.  
 
Once again, I want to make brief mention of Canada.   Our political and economic 
constitutions do not mention “labour” specifically.   However, in assigning  jurisdiction 
over labour matters  to the provinces rather than to the federal government,  the courts  
relied on constitutional  language that gave the provinces the right to legislate 
concerning  “matters of a merely local and private nature”  and those involving “civil [that 
is, contractual] rights”.   This characterization of labour matters has had important  
practical  effects:  it  forestalled  the emergence of national labour standards  and labour 
market institutions;  it   prevented the federal government from implementing 
international labour standards without provincial  consent;  and it  helped to dissolve  the 
national labour movement into a dozen relatively weak and sometimes warring 
provincial movements.    But its greatest effects have been symbolic:  if labour rights 
involve “merely local”  or “private” or contractual issues, how can they be regarded as  
issues  that fundamentally  divide the polity,  give rise to debates over  the 
maldistribution of wealth and power, or  engage the soaring rhetoric of the Charter.   In 
other words, Canada’s  political and economic constitutions contradict its juridical 
constitution, the Charter.      
 
This contradiction is unlikely to be resolved in favour of the Charter, especially in light of 
what amounts to the entrenchment of  neo-liberalism in Canada’s political and economic 
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constitutions.  I have in mind  Canada’s integration into a North American economic 
space dominated by the United States;  its commitment to monetarist policies 
administered by an autonomous central bank;  its fiscal practices that make the welfare 
state unaffordable; and an array of legal and practical constraints that make unworkable 
(not to say unthinkable) most  forms of regulation,  including the regulation of labour 
markets.    
 
Next,  I want to say a word about  the “constitution of the enterprise”.   A good deal of 
research and debate in recent years has focussed on how  workers are integrated (or 
not) into the governance of  the enterprise.   Here I’ll make special reference to North  
American experience which admittedly lags far behind the experience  of many 
European countries which, in turn, lags far behind the ideal-type of worker participation 
that is  supposed to prevail in those countries.     
 
In North America,  we have seen four models of enterprise constitutions, four  
experiments in enterprise governance that were all ostensibly designed to protect 
workers’   interests:    
 
 the collective bargaining model which attempted to endow  “citizens at work” with 
formal rights of association, voice and due process  analogous  to those they 
enjoy in the broader society;  
 the “stakeholder” model which  mandated  management decision-makers to  
address the best interests  not only  of  shareholders but also  of workers, 
customers, suppliers and others foreseeably affected by corporate action;   
 the “human capital” model  whose  rationale of  enlightened  self-interest  was 
meant to  persuade employers to treat  workers as valuable assets worthy of  
investment in the form of  good working conditions, benefits, amenities, training 
and, especially,  trust;  and  
 the “worker capitalist” model which reminded workers that  their  pension and 
other benefit  funds made them significant  members of  the  shareholding class, 
with  a stake in the success of predatory capitalism.   
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As things turned  out,  all four  of these North American experiments in  
“constitutionalizing” labour’s  role in workplace governance failed.  They did so in part 
because they sought to reform workplace governance without  taking into account  the 
aggressive  form of  liberal market capitalism that prevails in North America,  and in part 
because they neither  acknowledged nor addressed  the internal political economy of 
the enterprise itself.    The constitution of the enterprise, it turns out, cannot be reformed 
in isolation from the juridical, political and economic constitutions of the state.   Or in 
another formulation:  varieties of capitalism give rise to  varieties of workplace 
constitutions,  not vice versa.   
 
    
IV CONSTITUTIONALIZING THE GLOBAL WORKPLACE 
 
Capitalism, however,  operates not only within but across national borders.  Deep 
regional economic integration has been achieved  in Europe;  North America has gone 
some way down that path;  and  regional trade regimes have begun to emerge in South 
America, Asia and Africa.  The question is:  will it be possible to entrench  labour rights 
in whatever passes for the constitutions of  these regional regimes?    
 
Based on the European experience, one should  not be  too optimistic.   Even the  EU, 
which leads the world in this respect, has been oddly diffident  about entrenching   
collective labour rights in its “constitution”.   NAFTA has been even more diffident, 
though it has adopted a  so-called side-agreement, the North American Accord on 
Labour Cooperation, whose protection for labour rights  can most charitably be 
described as “minimalist”.   And so far as I know, none of the other regional trade 
regimes has come close to entrenching labour rights, except in a nominal sense.    It is 
hardly surprising, then, that the  WTO  with its global, rather than regional,  mandate 
has resolutely resisted making compliance with labour rights a condition of doing 
business in the world economy. 
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What about the International Labour Organization?  Almost 200 conventions  have been  
promulgated by the ILO; states that adopt these conventions  are obliged, under the ILO 
charter, to  implement them.   In addition,  the ILO has identified a core of labour rights 
whose implementation is required of states even without adoption, simply by virtue of 
their membership in that organization.    And finally,  ILO conventions have clearly 
influenced  national laws and constitutions  by osmosis as well as by explicit adoption.   
But does all of this confer  quasi-constitutional status on the  labour rights articulated by 
the ILO?    
 
Based on the behaviour of many ILO member states, including some advanced 
democracies, one would have to say not     However at the same time one must 
acknowledge the severe  practical problems of entrenching  labour rights  in  global 
workplaces. 
 
These workplaces  often  form part of a transnational value chain  linking  corporations 
based in the advanced economies with widely-dispersed partner firms, subsidiaries and 
arm’s-length suppliers.   It is therefore often difficult for workers to identify their ultimate 
employer.    Second,  given that  operations can be moved relatively freely  to different 
sites  along the value chain, or  off-loaded entirely,  employers are easily able to escape   
both legal constraints imposed by national governments and  pressures generated by 
unions or social movements.  Third,  “constitutionalization” implies that  workers will 
have the right to participate in the development of  norms governing  their own terms 
and conditions of employment.   However, their ability to do so is radically  constrained 
because they are located in different countries, speak different languages, are regulated 
by different laws, have different  (or no) traditions of concerted  action,  experience 
different  material circumstances and social environments and  may not even realize 
that they share a common employer.    
 
These are  all  formidable barriers to constitutionalizing employment relations in global 
enterprises.   And let me add one more:  the workers most in need of  protection are 
often located in the countries of the global south,  where labour standards are likely to 
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be lower than in the global north.  However,  attempts to project  labour  standards  from 
north to south  are almost certain to be regarded as a threat to the comparative 
advantage of developing countries, if not outright  neo-colonialism.     
 
So: the  constitutionalization of labour rights in the global context is almost  unthinkable.    
And yet, despite the absence of a  global constitution, of  global labour legislation, of a  
global  labour inspectorate or a global labour movement, there is some evidence that 
labour rights are taking hold in places where they never existed before.   Under attack  
from unions,  social movements and political opponents,  governments of  the home 
countries of global corporations try to persuade or pressure those corporations  to 
behave decently  when they operate abroad.  To  some extent  as well,  acceptable 
labour standards become  imbricated in corporate  policies, practices and routines of 
work that  are disseminated outward  from the head office to all the elements of  the 
global enterprise.   And finally,  to some extent  ideas about labour rights — like ideas 
about sport, style and sex —  just  percolate across borders, at both the grassroots and 
the elite level;  through the media and by word of mouth;  and with both positive and 
negative consequences.     
  
I mention these promising developments — in today’s vernacular, “green shoots” —  in 
order to suggest  that perhaps constitutions are sometimes created  from the bottom up 
rather than the top down, that they may result from an accidental concatenation of 
unrelated events rather that  from the deliberations of august assemblies, that they may  
be shaped  by  practical  struggles in particular domains rather than by the 
comprehensive designs of legal architects.   
 
V CONCLUSION  
 
I have framed this  last observation as a commentary on the constitutionalization of 
labour rights in the global economy.     But now, in conclusion, I will suggest that it 
applies as well to  domestic constitutions.   I return to my earlier juxtaposition of  formal 
juridical constitutions and   political,  economic and enterprise constitutions.  
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Clearly states  can adopt juridical constitutions; they can  entrench  labour rights; they 
can make those rights justiciable;  they can authorize citizens to sue to  defend their 
rights; and they can authorize the courts to  award them remedies.  In fact,  this sort of 
constitutionalization proceeds  at  a manic pace:  since  1789  national constitutions  
have had a median life span of  17 years, and an  average life span of less than half 
that.     But what does this sort of constitutionalization  signify?    Do we really imagine 
that each new constitution brings fundamental change to the state that adopts it?  that 
rights made justiciable thereby become effective in the real world?  that  citizens and 
workers)  endowed with  those rights will actually be empowered?  that courts that 
acquire  remedial powers can and will  attempt to use them to realign the deep 
structures of  economy and polity?  and that if they do so, they will succeed in 
transforming global capitalism and making the world safer for workers?   
I have asked what appear to be four distinct questions, but are all really  variations on a 
single theme:  scepticism about rights-based, litigation-driven juridical models of 
constitutionalism.   I  conclude by offering in place of scepticism  four  hypotheses that 
are, in my view, entirely plausible:   
 the constitution that counts is the “real” constitution that expresses, normalizes,
legitimates and therefore reinforces actual-existing relations of power;
 in the event of conflict, the “real” constitution will prevail  over  juridical
constitutions;
 strategies designed to produce significant  change though  constitutional
litigation will prove to  be  disappointing for  labour advocates and, in the long 
run, for human rights advocates as well; and 
 workers with an  inclination and  capacity for collective action will find a way to
vindicate their “rights” whatever the juridical constitution might say or however 
the courts might rule.   
I hypothesize, therefore I am. 
